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Academics and practitioners around the world are daily involved in the 
discussion of the role of financial advisors. There is puzzling evidence 
regarding the role of top tier advisors in the capture of abnormal returns 
in domestic US acquisitions. Our work is an important step forward in 
solving the puzzle. We find evidence that (1) hiring a top tier investment 
bank is relevant on public cross border transactions (2) and that the tier 
of the advisor has little relevance when the acquirer is an experienced 
investor. This is a strong indication that top tier advisors do matter when 
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1  Introduction 
In 2012, the volume of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) accounted for 3.5% of the world GDP 
(20% of the United States GDP).1 Mergers and acquisitions are a source of value derived from 
synergies, economies of scale, and increased market power [Liu and Qiu (2013)]. However, they 
also have costs associated. In 2012, firms spent US$ 24.7 billions in advisory fees to financial 
advisor according to Thomson Reuters estimates. Financial advisors are hired to perform the 
valuation, negotiation and execution of the deal.  
The role of financial advisors is one of the most discussed topics in M&As not only by academics 
[Servaes and Zenner (1996), Ismail (2010), Golubov et al. (2012)] but also by practitioners. For 
example, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters gather the information concerning the deals in a 
specific period and they release tables with the position of each investment bank in terms of deal 
value and volume of transactions (League Tables).  Each period investment banks await to know 
their positions on the League Tables. But why are these League Tables so important? Do top tier 
investment banks deliver higher returns to their clients? 
This paper analyzes the role of top tier investment banks by comparing acquisitions in which the 
financial advisor of the acquirer is a top tier investment bank (one of the banks with higher deal 
value) versus a non-top tier investment bank. Our work provides additional insightful view to the 
literature on the role of financial advisors by (1) showing the relevance of top tier advisors in 
domestic and cross border acquisitions, and; (2) considering the role of experienced acquirers, such 
as institutional investors. 
Previous literature only focuses on the role of top tier investment banks in domestic acquisitions, 
in which both acquirers and targets are US firms. While some previous papers show that there is 
no relationship between the use of top tier investment banks and the abnormal returns of the 
                                                 
1 Nominal world GDP from IMF and M&A values from Thomson Reuters Merger and Acquisitions Review (2012).   
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acquirer [Servaes and Zenner (1996)] others show that the relationship is negative [Ismail (2010)] 
and there is also evidence that the relationship is positive [Golubov et al. (2012)]. Servaes and 
Zenner (1996) shows that the returns earned by the acquirer do not depend on the choice or use 
of an investment bank as advisor, however they only consider the largest acquisitions from 1981 
to 1992. This sample excludes the wave of cross border acquisitions from 1992 to 2000 [Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)]. Rau (2000) shows that US acquirers advised by top tier 
investment banks earn significantly lower abnormal returns but their analysis is based on a small 
sample of acquisitions (less than 600) from 1980 to 1991. Ismail (2010) presents the same 
conclusions as Rau (2000) but with a significantly larger sample from 1985 to 2004. These papers 
are mainly focused in the 1990s, period characterized by excessive premiums, large acquirer losses 
and large deal values [Moeller et al. (2005)]. Neither of the previous papers controls for the 
endogeneity problem that might exist in the choice of the advisor [Golubov et al. (2012)]. The 
abnormal returns might not be higher because the advisor is a top tier investment bank but because 
the top tier investment banks choose the deals where the returns are expected to be higher. 
Golubov et al. (2012) controls for this sample bias and shows that in acquisitions in which both 
the acquirer and the target are US public firms, top tier advisors deliver higher cumulative 
abnormal returns that their non-top tier counterparts. Golubov et. al (2012) provides the intuition 
that the tier is only significant in public acquisitions because these are more complex transactions 
where the expertise, know-how and reputation of the bank are more relevant.  
Our first hypothesis is that if the tier of the investment bank is only relevant in more complex 
domestic deals then it should also be significant in cross border acquisitions as they bring added 
complexity. If this result is confirmed we are one step closer to solving the puzzling evidence on 
the role of top tier financial advisors. Cross border acquisitions are more complex transactions due 
to different regulatory environments, exchange rate risks, and different type of synergies (more 
likely revenue and financial synergies and not cost synergies). 
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Previous literature focuses mainly on the role of advisors in domestic deals and not in cross border 
acquisitions. This is a topic of relevance as the number of deals where the acquirer is a US firm 
and the target is a non-US firm has been increasing across time. The deals in which the target is a 
non-US firm increased from less than 9% in 1990 to 21% of the deals where the acquirer is a US 
firm, from Thomson One Banker. This result is not only caused by the decrease of domestic deals 
but also by the increase of cross border acquisitions. With the capital and product markets 
integration, globalization has become a strategic decision for firms. This increase in the market for 
corporate control and assets, together with the gains associated with geographical expansion 
explains the increase in the number of cross border acquisitions [Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005)]. However, the literature on the role of investment banks in cross border acquisitions has 
not kept pace with this trend. 
We investigate if the acquirer cumulative abnormal returns of US firms are explained by the tier 
of the investment bank used as financial advisor in domestic and cross border deals. We show that 
the tier of the investment bank is significant in both domestic and cross border deals if the target 
is a public firm. This can be explained by the fact that the expertise and reputation of the bank are 
more relevant in more complex deals. Public acquisitions are more complex deals where the impact 
of the acquisition is not only reflected in the stock price of the acquirer but also of the target. The 
higher complexity of these deals is also explained by the higher bargaining power of listed firms 
and regulation of public acquisitions [Fuller et al. (2002)].  
If top tier advisors only have an impact on the cumulative abnormal returns in more complex deals 
where their reputation and expertise are more relevant what happens when the acquirer is an 
experienced investor? Our second hypothesis is that in deals where the acquirer is an experienced 
investor the tier should not be significant as the acquirer already has the experience and know-
how. We test if the tier is also significant in acquisitions where the acquirer is an institutional 
investor. Institutional investors are an increasingly important player in financial markets. 
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According to OECD, in 2012, institutions as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual 
funds held more than US$ 70 trillion euros in assets. The assets under management have more 
than tripled since the beginning of 1990 [International Monetary Fund (2005)]. IMF (2005) reports 
that the investment decisions of institutional investors increasingly “make markets”. But is this 
ability to “make markets” also reflected in the ability to “make acquisitions”? We add a new 
extension to the literature on the role of institutional investors and we test the relevance of the 
choice of investment bank when the acquirer is an institutional investor. We show that the choice 
of a top tier investment banks has no impact on returns when the acquirer is an institutional 
investor. This can be explained by the fact that the investment expertise and know-how of an 
institutional investor makes the added value of a top tier investment bank not significant.  
This paper makes important contributions to the M&As and to the advisory reputation literature. 
There is puzzling evidence regarding the role of top tier advisors in the capture of abnormal returns 
in domestic US acquisitions. Our work is an important step forward in solving this puzzle. Firstly, 
we show that the tier of the investment bank has a positive impact on the returns of the acquirer 
around the announcement date in acquisitions of public targets for both domestic and cross border 
deals. Secondly, we show that the tier of the advisor has little relevance when the acquirer is an 
experienced investor. This is a strong evidence that the top tier advisors do matter when their 
advice is most needed and that the rank of the financial advisor on the League Tables signals the 
quality of the services provided. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology. Section 
3 describes the data used. Section 4 shows the results. Section 5 presents robustness checks. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2   Methodology 
To test whether the returns of the acquirer depend on the tier of the investment bank, we compute 
the acquirer’s abnormal returns using the event study’s methodology [MacKinlay (1997)]. We use 
an estimation windows of -240 to -39 days prior to the announcement date and an event windows 
of 5 days (−2 to +2), where day 0 is the day of the announcement. The market model is used to 
measure performance, where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the return of the acquirer i in day t and 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 is the market return 
in period t :  
                                                               𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                       (1) 
The market return is the value-weighted index return from CRSP. We consider as cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) the sum of abnormal returns from day −2 to +2. To test if the CAR 
depends on the tier of the investment bank used as financial advisor by the acquirer, we estimate 
the following regression where 𝑥 is a vector of variables that also affect the returns of the acquirer:  
                                                           𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖
′ + 𝛾𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                                                   (2) 
Following the methodology of Golubov et al. (2012), we control for acquirer and deal specific 
variables, 𝑥, that are proven to affect the returns of the acquirer: size, book-to-market, run-up, 
sigma, interaction between method of payment and status of the target, relative size, diversifying 
deals, tender offers, hostile deals, premium, leverage and cash flows-to-equity. Moeller et al. (2004) 
shows that acquirer announcement returns are negatively related to firm size. Dong et al. (2006) 
presents evidence that there is a positive relationship between higher book-to-market ratios and 
cumulative abnormal returns. Run-up is the difference between the daily acquirer´s returns and 
the market return compounded over a specific period. Rosen (2006) shows that “hot merger 
markets”, this is, markets with higher run-up are associated with negative returns for acquiring 
firms. Sigma measures idiosyncratic volatility. Moeller et al. (2007) shows that differences in 
abnormal returns between acquisitions types can be explained by differences in the relation 
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between abnormal returns and idiosyncratic volatility across deal types, for example acquirers with 
higher idiosyncratic volatility have lower announcement returns in acquisitions paid with stocks. 
Fuller et al. (2002) shows that acquirer returns are positive only when the target is a private or 
subsidiary firm and not a public firm. They also show that acquirer returns decrease with the 
relative size of the target in public acquisitions and increase in private and subsidiary ones. Travlos 
(1987) associates acquisitions paid with stocks with lower abnormal announcement returns. 
Villalonga (2004) shows that diversification does not destroy value. Tender offers are deals in 
which the acquirer makes a public announcement to encourage the target’s shareholders to sell 
their shares at a given price in a specific time interval. Jensen (1983) reviews the market for 
corporate control and shows that tender offers are related with higher announcement returns for 
the acquirer. Hostile deals are acquisitions where the acquirer does not come to an agreement with 
the managers of the target but only with the shareholders. Previous literature presents evidence 
that hostile deals are associated with lower acquirer returns [Servaes (1991)]. Maloney et al. (1993) 
shows evidence of a positive relation between leverage and acquirer returns at the announcement 
period. Lang et al. (1991) shows a negative relationship between acquirer returns and cash flows-
to-equity. 
We add two control variables to the methodology of Golubov et. al (2012). We control for cross-
border acquisitions following Morck and Yeung (1992) and Markides and Ittner (1994)  who show 
that firms with valuable intangible assets have a positive stock price reaction after the 
announcement of a cross border acquisition and that international acquisitions create value for 
acquiring firms. The cross border dummy variable is equal to one if the target is not an US firm 
and zero otherwise. We also add a dummy variable for the institutional status of the target (it is 
equal to one if the acquirer is an institutional investor). We control for institutional acquirers given 
that institutional investors have a significant role on the corporate governance of firms through 
their allocation of funds [International Monetary Fund (2005)].  
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We consider the first eight investment banks as “top tier” following the methodology of Golubov 
et al. (2012). Golubov et al. (2012) shows that there is an endogeneity problem between the 
cumulative abnormal returns and the choice of financial advisor. The cumulative abnormal returns 
might not be higher because the advisor is a top tier investment bank but because a top tier bank 
is able to choose better deals where the returns are expected to be higher, which leads to a sample 
bias. We follow the methodology of Golubov et al. (2012) and we use the Heckman two-step 
procedure to test for this sample bias [Heckman (1979)]. The first stage equation [Equation (3)] is 
a probit regression that models the choice between a top tier and a non-top tier investment bank, 
where 𝑧 is a vector of characteristics that affect the choice between the tier of financial advisor. 
The instrumental variable scope accounts for the number of times that in the past (after 1985) the 
acquirer has used a top tier investment bank as a financial advisor on a buy-side (as an acquirer) or 
on a sell-side (as a target) in a previous acquisition.  
                                               𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝜕𝑧𝑖
′ + 𝜌 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖                                                      (3) 
From Equation (3), we construct an inverse Mills ratio that is used as an additional regressor in 
Equation (4).  
                                        𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖
′ + 𝜃𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                                      (4) 
If the estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant, then we have a 
problem of selection bias that needs to be addressed.                            
3   Data 
We use data on acquisitions announced between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2012 from 
both Thomson One Banker and Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers 
and Acquisitions databases.2 Our sample includes US firms acquiring US firms (domestic deals) 
                                                 
2 Combining both databases increases the number of observations in 20%. 
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and non-US firms (cross border acquisitions). We consider deals where the acquirer is a public 
firm and the target is a public, private or subsidiary firm. We only consider public acquirers because 
stock data is needed to compute returns. 
We collect an initial sample of 38,846 observations (for US targets) and 11,723 observations (for 
non-US targets). Only deals worth more than US$ 1 M are included. After these we exclude the 
deals where the financial advisor of the acquirer is not reported which leads to a final number of 
8,723 observations for US targets and 2,064 observations for non-US targets. We require a change 
of control, which means that prior to the transaction the acquirer needs to have less than 50% of 
the company and after the deal it has to have the majority of the shares (more than 50%) which 
leads to a sample of 7,859 observations for domestic deals and 1,843 observations for cross border 
deals. 
We collect the acquirer’s stock market quotes from CRSP. We adjust the historical series for stock 
splits using the cumulative adjustment factor from CRSP.  The number of shares outstanding 
needed to compute the equity value is also extracted from CRSP.  The accounting data that 
includes book to market, leverage and cash flows to equity of the acquirer is extracted from 
Compustat. After filtering all the deals where the historical series of prices or the accounting data 
are not provided, the final sample reduces to a total of 5,564 observations for US targets and 1,300 
observations for non-US targets. Finally, in order to divide the sample of acquirers between 
institutional and non-institutional investors we retrieve a list of SEC filings of institutional 
investors from Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings, formerly known as Spectrum, and 
we match them with our database. 
We use as criterion to define whether a financial advisor is a top tier the rank of the League Tables 
as these tables are frequently used. Table 1 presents the Top 8 investment banks in 2012, summary 
statistics of the deals advised by these banks in 2012, and the number of times they were top tier 
from 1990 to 2012. The data concerning the deal value and the deal count is obtained from 
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Bloomberg.  League tables are persistent across time. For example, Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan 
were always one of the eight top investment banks in the period across 1990 and 2012. 
Table 1: League Table 











Goldman Sachs & Co 565,438 1,528 370 20 
Morgan Stanley 476,986 1,265 377 21 
JP Morgan 449,244 1,748 257 21 
Citigroup 416,427 1,928 216 18 
Credit Suisse 382,822 1,629 235 15 
Barclays 380,120 1,403 271 4 
Deutsche Bank AG 365,709 1,784 205 13 
Bank of America Merrill 
Lynch 
334,755 1,633 205 5 
     
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of M&As from 1990 to 2012 for the deals 
where the target is a US firm (Panel A and B) and a non-US firm (Panel C and D). The target can 
be a public, private or subsidiary firm.  
The cumulative abnormal returns are significantly higher when the target is a non-US firm. This 
could be explained by the gains due to geographical diversification (different regulatory 
environment, client diversifications, diversified labor work force), synergies (access to new 
suppliers, lower transport costs, overhead synergies, leverage best-practices), economies of scale 
and scope, and increased market power. Eun et al. (1996) shows that cross border acquisitions are 
generally synergy creating activities. Seth et al. (2002) shows that the sources of value in cross 
border acquisitions are asset sharing, internalization of valuable intangible assets, and financial 
diversification. Conn and Connell (1990) shows that the gains of cross border acquisitions are also 




Table 2: Deal and acquirer characteristics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the sample of acquisitions from 1990 to 2012 where the acquirer is a 
US company and the target is either a private, public or subsidiary US or non-US company. The sample is divided in 
deals where the acquirer hires a financial advisor (“all sample”) and in deals where the acquirer hires a top tier or a 
non-top tier financial advisor (Goldman Sachs & Co, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Citi, Credit Suisse, Barclays, 
Deutsche Bank, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch). Panel A presents the mean statistics for the acquirer 
characteristics when the target is an US company: size; run-up; sigma; book-to-market; and leverage. Panel B presents 
the average deal characteristics when the acquirer is a US company: cumulative abnormal returns (CAR); deal value; 
relative size; proportion of public, private and subsidiary deals; proportion of diversifying deals (deals where the SIC 
code of the acquirer is different from the SIC code of the target); proportion of deals where the payment includes 
stocks; proportion of hostile deals (deals where the acquirer does not come to an agreement with the managers of the 
target but only with the shareholders); proportion of tender offers (deals where the acquirer makes a public 
announcement to encourage the target’s shareholders to sell their shares at a given price in a specific time interval) 
and; premium for public acquisitions. Panel C presents the same statistics for the acquirer characteristics but when 
the target is a non-US firm. Panel D presents the average deal characteristics when the acquirer is a non-US firm. 
  All Sample Top Tier (1) Non Top Tier (2)  (1)-(2) 
 Mean Mean Mean p-value 
Panel A: Acquirer Characteristics (target US) 
Size (US$, M) 5,667 12,305 3,454 0.000 
Run-up 1.122 1.134 1.117 0.336 
Sigma 0.028 0.024 0.029 0.000 
Book-to-market 0.612 0.531 0.639 0.000 
Leverage 0.191 0.248 0.171 0.000 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.039 0.000 0.052 0.179 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics (target US) 
CAR (-2, +2) % 0.003 -0.142 0.052 0.579 
Deal Value (US$, M) 1,291 2,758 803 0.000 
Relative size 13.682 15.077 13.217 0.282 
Public deals 0.529 0.593 0.508 0.000 
Private deals 0.290 0.196 0.321 0.000 
Subsidiary deals 0.181 0.211 0.171 0.001 
Payment includes stock 0.704 0.635 0.727 0.003 
Diversifying deals 0.385 0.403 0.379 0.107 
Hostile deals 0.026 0.040 0.022 0.002 
Tender offers 0.065 0.094 0.055 0.000 
Premium (only for Public) 0.383 0.385 0.382 0.895 
Number of observations 5,564 1,391 4,173 - 
Panel C: Acquirer Characteristics (target non-US) 
Size (US$, M) 16,232 25,453 12,291 0.001 
Run-up 1.120 1.078 1.138 0.046 
Sigma 0.026 0.023 0.028 0.000 
Book-to-market 0.010 0.004 0.013 0.007 
Leverage 0.188 0.187 0.188 0.971 
Cash flows-to-equity 0.128 0.099 140 0.205 
Panel D: Deal Characteristics (target non-US) 
CAR (-2, +2) % 0.475 0.823 0.327 0.378 
Deal Value (US$, M) 607 1,136 381 0.000 
Relative size 14.670 15.391 14.359 0.843 
Public deals 0.335 0.358 0.325 0.246 
Private deals 0.273 0.176 0.314 0.000 
Subsidiary deals 0.393 0.465 0.362 0.001 
Payment includes stock 0.588 0.522 0.616 0.002 
Diversifying deals 0.366 0.345 0.375 0.306 
Hostile deals 0.028 0.036 0.024 0.272 
Tender offers 0.185 0.182 0.186 0.857 
Premium (only for Public) 0.430 0.398 0.447 0.449 
Number of observations 1,306 391 915 - 
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For both domestic and cross border acquisitions we do not reject that the cumulative abnormal 
returns are equal in the deals that were advised by top tier investment banks versus the ones advised 
by non-top tier banks. The acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement 
period are negative in domestic acquisitions in which the advisor is a top tier investment bank. 
However there are other significant differences that might explain this result. For example, the 
deal value is significantly higher in deals advised by top tier investment banks and there is an 
empirical negative relationship between size and returns [Moeller et al. (2004)]. 
US firms that bid for cross border targets have a substantially larger market capitalization than US 
firms that bid for domestic targets. US firms that acquire cross border targets present also higher 
cash flows-to-equity and lower book-to-market ratios.  In terms of deal characteristics domestic 
acquisitions have a higher proportion of public targets than cross border acquisitions (53% versus 
34%). The type of target is more evenly divided in cross border acquisitions. Whilst in cross border 
acquisitions, the majority of acquisitions are of subsidiary firms (39%), in domestic acquisition this 
type of acquisitions are a minority (18%). The percentage of tender offers is also higher in cross 
border acquisitions. Domestic acquisitions use proportionally more stocks as a method of payment 
than cross border acquisitions. Our sample presents the same characteristics as the ones described 
by Moeller and Schlingemann (2005)  that  show that, compared to domestic acquisitions, cross 
border acquisitions exhibit lower book-to-market values, more free cash flows-to-equity, involve 
more often payments with cash, involve less often private targets, and have a higher proportion of 
tender offer and hostile deals. 
In domestic acquisitions, acquirers advised by top tier investment banks have lower sigma, lower 
book-to-market ratios, and higher leverage than acquirers advised by non-top tier banks. The 
differences in run-up and cash flows-to-equity are not statistically significant. In cross border 
acquisitions, acquirers advised by top tier investment banks have lower run-up, lower sigma and 
lower book-to-market than acquirers advised by non-top tier banks. The differences in leverage 
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and cash flows-to-equity are not statistically significant between acquirers that hire top tier 
investment banks versus those that hire non top tier investment banks. Deals where the advisor is 
a top tier bank have significantly larger acquirers and larger deal value, than those advised by non-
top tier banks, both for domestic and cross border acquisitions. The differences in relative size are 
not significant between the Tier of the advisor used. Top tier investment banks advise 
proportionally more deals when the target is a public or subsidiary firm than deals where the target 
is a private company. There are not statistically significant differences in terms of the use of top 
tier or not top tier banks when the payment includes stocks. In domestic acquisitions, top tier 
investment banks are more used in hostile deals and in tender offers than their non-tier 
counterparts. This difference is not statistically significant in cross border acquisitions. There are 
not significant differences in the use of top tier or non-tier investment banks in terms of 
diversifying deals and premium paid (in public acquisitions). 
Figure 1 presents the sectorial and geographical target distribution. Panel A shows the sectorial 
distribution of US targets and Panel B of non-US across time. The majority of the US targets are 
from the financial sector (30%), manufacturing (27%) or services (24%) firms whereas the majority 
of the non-US targets are manufacturing (47%) and service firms (23%). Amel et al. (2004) points 
to the fact that the limitations imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act up to 1999 could have hampered 
the realization of gains from cross selling and geographical expansion. This might explain the lower 
proportion of financial targets in our sample of cross border acquisitions. 
Panel C shows the geographical distribution of non US targets across time. The majority of the 
cross border targets are from Europe (61%) and Canada (19%).  Developing countries, which we 






Figure 1: Sectorial and geographical target distribution 
Panel A presents the distribution of targets’ industry for domestic acquisitions from 1990 to 2012. Panel B presents 
the distribution of targets’ industry for cross border acquisitions. Panel C presents the distribution of cross border 
acquisitions across continents from 1990 to 2012 (target is a non-US firm). North America excludes United States. 
Panel A: Distribution of targets’ industry for US firms (domestic acquisitions)  
Panel B: Distribution of targets’ industry for non-US firms (cross border acquisitions) 
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4   Results 
We aim to find a clear and consistent answer to the puzzling role of financial advisors in 
acquisitions. To do this, we test if the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal returns depend on the tier 
of the investment bank used as financial advisor. Our main variable of interest is Tier that takes 
the value of one if the financial advisor of the acquirer is one of the eight investment banks with 
higher deal value (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Barclays, 
Deutsche Bank, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch), and zero otherwise. We control for other 
variables that, are proven in previous literature and that we explained in the methodology section, 
affect the returns around the announcement period. The coefficients of Equation (2) are estimated 
by OLS and the results are presented in Table 3. The standard errors are adjusted for 
heterocedasticity and bidder clustering. We also control for year fixed effects. 
All the signs of the coefficients for the all sample are in accordance with previous literature with 
exception of sigma and cash flows-to-equity. The sigma coefficient is positive, which means that 
higher idiosyncratic volatility leads to higher abnormal returns. Our result is consistent with the 
financial hypothesis that higher risk is correlated with higher returns [Ludvigson and Ng (2007)]. 
Golubov et. al (2012) also presents positive estimates for the sigma coefficient. The positive cash 
flows-to-equity coefficients contradict previous literature that shows that acquisitions by “cash-
rich” firms are value decreasing [Lang et al. (1991) and Harford (2002)]. The positive impact of 
cash flows-to-equity might be justified by the fact that acquisitions improve long-term cash flow 
performance of both acquirer and target relatively to industry peers [Andrade et al. (2001)]. 
As our sample includes cross border acquisitions, we add a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the target is a non US firm. The cross border variable is significant at 1% level. The cross 
border coefficient is positive which is in line with previous literature that shows that cross border 
acquisitions are value enhancing [Morck and Yeung (1992), Markides and Ittner (1994), Seth et al. 
(2002)]. We also add another dummy variable to the methodology of Golubov et al. (2012) that  
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Table 3: Cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
for a sample of acquisitions from 1990 to 2012 
This table presents the results of the regression analysis (Equation (2)) of the cumulative abnormal returns of the 
acquirer on the tier of the investment bank used as financial advisor and on other acquirer and deal characteristics. 
The acquirer is a US public firm and the target is an US or non-US public, private or subsidiary firm. The standard 
errors are adjusted for heterocedasticity and bidder clustering. The regressions are controlled for year fixed effects. 
The symbols ***, ** and *, represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. N 
designates the number of observations. The total number of observations includes public deals in which the premium 
was not available, and that are not in included when we run the regression only for public targets. 
  All (1) Public (2) Private (3) Subsidiary (4) 
Intercept 0.026 * -0.009  0.023  0.017  
Tier 0.010 *** 0.009 ** 0.007  -0.001  
Size -0.004 *** -0.003 ** -0.003  -0.001  
Book-to-market 0.013 *** 0.015 *** 0.011  0.014  
Run-up -0.010 *** -0.012 ** -0.006  -0.011  
Sigma 0.390 ** -0.014  0.563 * 0.617  
Public x all cash -0.027 ***      
Public x paym. incl. stock -0.057 ***      
Private x all cash -0.010        
Private x paym. incl. stock -0.009        
Subsidiary x all cash -0.004        
Payment incl. stock   -0.028 *** -0.002  -0.006  
Relative size 0.007  0.000  0.020 *** 0.025 ** 
Diversifying deals 0.002  0.003  0.008  0.001  
Tender offers 0.015 ** 0.009 * 0.113 ***  
Hostile deals -0.012 * -0.009      
Premium   -0.010 ***    
Leverage 0.018 *** 0.021 *** 0.015  0.000  
Cash flows-to-equity 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000  
Cross border 0.027 *** 0.035 *** 0.011  0.015  
Institutional investor 0.011 ** 0.014 ** -0.004  0.006  
N 6,864  2,971  1,968  1,517  
R2 (%) 10.39   9.16   9.02   19.08   
 
takes the value of one if the acquirer is an institutional investor, and zero otherwise. It is significant 
at a 5% level. The coefficient associated with the institutional investor variable is positive which 
means that when the acquirer is an institutional investor the cumulative abnormal returns around 
the announcement day are higher. This positive impact on the returns around the announcement 
period might be explained by the fact that institutional investors are more informed investors due 
to the nature of their operations and number of assets under management. The increasingly 
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relevant impact of institutional investors in financial markets is widely accepted [IMF (2005), Dor 
(2003), Edmans (2009)]. 
After controlling for variables that are proven to affect the returns around the announcement day, 
we show that the acquirer cumulative abnormal returns depend on the tier of investment bank for 
the all sample of acquisitions. To test different hypothesis about the significance of the Tier 
variable, we divide our sample between different target status, US and non-US targets and diverse 
types of acquirers (institutional, extraordinary, and experienced). 
Hypothesis 1: The significance of the Tier variable is related to the complexity of the deal. 
Our first research hypothesis is that top Tier investment banks should add more value in more 
complex deals that demand higher negotiation skills and more complex valuation methods. In 
order to analyze this hypothesis, we test if the significance is different if the target is a public, 
private or subsidiary firm, and if it is different between domestic and cross border acquisitions.  
Public transactions are more complex than acquisitions of private or subsidiary firms due to several 
reasons. Public targets have higher bargaining power which can be reflected in the amount of 
synergies captured by the target [Fuller et al. (2002)]. It is also more difficult to reclaim any 
compensation if the target does not disclose significant information in the due diligence findings 
due to the higher dispersion of ownership [Golubov et al. (2012)]. 
We show that the variable Tier is statistically significant at a 5% level if the target is a public firm. 
However, we do not attain the same results when we consider private or subsidiary targets. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis of the relevance of the tier in more complex deals. When the target 
is public not only the share price of the acquirer but also of the target can be affected, which 
increases the complexity and the impact of the acquisition. There is also a higher reputational 
exposure in public acquisitions [Rhee and Valdez (2009)] that might generate higher incentives for 
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investment banks to outperform. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that top tier advisors 
do matter when their advice is most needed. 
Previous studies focus on the relevance of cross border acquisitions as a mode of foreign 
investment [Kogut and Singh (1988)], transfer of knowledge and organizational learning process  
[Vermeulen and Barkena (2001)], and of shareholder’s wealth creation [Morck and Yeung (1992)].  
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) discusses the higher complexity in terms of valuation for cross 
border targets versus domestic targets. The former complexity can be explained by different 
regulatory environment and different exchange rate. For example, Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) 
indicates that exchange rate movements have a significant role in foreign direct investment through 
acquisitions. Table 4 presents the results of the Tier coefficient when we estimate Equation (2) for 
subsamples of domestic and cross border deals.   
Table 4: Cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
for a sample of acquisitions from 1990 to 2012 for domestic and cross border acquisitions 
This table presents the results of the regression analysis (Equation (2)) of the cumulative abnormal returns of the 
acquirer on the tier of the investment bank used as financial advisor and on other acquirer and deal characteristics. 
This table only shows the coefficients of the Tier variable but the regression is estimated with the all the control 
variables shown in Table 3 and described in the methodology section. Panel A presents the Tier coefficient for the 
whole sample. Panel B presents the Tier coefficient for domestic acquisitions (acquirer is a US public company and 
the target is a US public, private or subsidiary company). Panel C presents the Tier coefficient for cross border 
acquisitions (acquirer is a US public company and the target is a non-US public, private or subsidiary company). The 
standard errors are adjusted for heterocedasticity and bidder clustering. The regressions are controlled for year fixed 
effects. The symbols ***, ** and *, represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
N designates the number of observations. The total number of observations includes public deals in which the 
premium was not available, and that are not in included when we run the regression only for public targets. 
  All (1) Public (2) Private (3) Subsidiary (4) 
Panel A: All sample 
Tier 0.010 *** 0.009 ** 0.007  -0.001  
N 6,864  2,971  1,968  1,517  
R2 (%) 10.39  9.16  9.02  19.08  
Panel B: Domestic acquisitions 
Tier 0.009 ** 0.009 ** 0.007  0.006  
N 5,564  2,647  1,612  1,006  
R2 (%) 13.64  9.20  11.09  31.40  
Panel C: Cross border acquisitions 
Tier 0.007  0.018 ** 0.022  0.000  
N 1,300  327  356  511  
R2 (%) 6.11  15.10  7.70  17.35  
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Our hypothesis is that the Tier variable should be more relevant in cross border acquisitions due 
to this higher valuation complexity. We do not find different results in terms of the Tier significance 
and sign in domestic and cross border acquisitions - the Tier coefficient is still only significant for 
public acquisitions.  
We use a Chow test to test if the Tier variable is more significant in cross border acquisitions. We 
do not reject the null hypothesis that the Tier coefficient is equal in domestic and cross border 
acquisitions. This result holds for both public, private and subsidiary deals.  
Hypothesis 2: The Tier variable is not significant when the acquirer is an experienced 
investor. 
Our second research hypothesis is that the Tier significance should be related to the experience of 
the acquirer firm. We consider different types of experienced investors: institutional investors, 
extraordinary acquirers and acquirers that bid for both domestic and cross border targets.  
4.1  Institutional Acquirers 
Institutions such as mutual funds, investment banks, insurance companies and pension funds have 
an increasingly relevant role in financial markets. IMF (2005) reports that the investment decisions 
of institutional investors increasingly “make markets”. There is an extensively discussion of the 
impact of “smart money” in different corporate events. For example, Dor (2003) shows that initial 
public offerings (IPO) with a largest share of institutional ownership outperform IPOs with 
smaller shares of institutional ownership. Edmans (2009) shows that trading by informed 
shareholders leads stock prices to more accurately reflect the fundamental value of the firm. But 
is this ability to “make markets” also reflected in the ability to “make acquisitions”?  
We divide our sample in two subsamples, as we consider acquisitions in which the acquirer is an 
institutional investor and acquisitions by non-institutional investors. We run the same regression 
as before and we show that when an institutional investor bids for a public company the use of a 
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top tier investment bank is not significant (but it is significant if the acquirer is a non-institutional 
investor). Table 5 presents the Tier coefficient results of Equation (2) for a subsample of 
institutional acquirers. We show that the ability of institutional investors to “make markets” is also 
reflected in the ability to “make acquisitions”. The investment expertise and know-how of 
institutional investors makes the added value of a top tier investment bank not significant in public 
acquisitions. 
Table 5: Cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
for a sample of acquisitions from 1990 to 2012 performed by institutional investors 
This table presents the results of the regression analysis (Equation (2)) of the cumulative abnormal returns of the 
acquirer on the tier of the investment bank used as financial advisor and on other acquirer and deal characteristics. 
The acquirer is an institutional investor. This table only shows the coefficients of the Tier variable but the regression 
is estimated with the all the control variables shown in Table 3 and described in the methodology section. The standard 
errors are adjusted for heterocedasticity and bidder clustering. The regressions are controlled for year fixed effects. 
The symbols ***, ** and *, represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  N 
designates the number of observations. The total number of observations includes public deals in which the premium 
was not available, and that are not in included when we run the regression only for public targets. 
 
  All (1) Public (2) Private (3) Subsidiary (4) 
Tier 0.019 ** 0.004  0.051  0.045  
N 208  117  31  48  
R2 (%) 29.56   25.63   86.45   83.66   
 
4.2  Extraordinary Acquirers 
Golubov et al. (2013) studies acquirers that persistently generate positive announcement returns. 
Firms that in the past executed more than two acquisitions and had positive cumulative abnormal 
returns in all the acquisitions performed are classified as extraordinary acquirers. All the other 
acquirers are classified as normal acquirers. Extraordinary acquirers represent less than 10% of our 
sample. The cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement the period are on average 8% 
to extraordinary acquirers and only less than 1% for normal acquirers. Golubov et al. (2013) 
associates the superior performance of extraordinary acquirers with the presence of  top quality 
management teams. We test if the Tier variable is still significant if we only consider deals 
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performed by extraordinary acquirers. In order to this, we divide our sample between extraordinary 
and normal acquirers and we show that the Tier variable is still significant for both cases. This 
implies that even if the acquirer has a top quality management team the fact that the investment 
bank is one of the top tiers has still an impact on the returns.  
Table 6: Cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
for a sample of acquisitions from 1990 to 2012 performed by extraordinary and normal 
acquirers 
This table presents the results of the regression analysis (Equation (2)) of the cumulative abnormal returns of the 
acquirer on the tier of the investment bank used as financial advisor and on other acquirer and deal characteristics. 
This table only shows the coefficients of the Tier variable but the regression is estimated with the all the control 
variables shown in Table 3 and described in the methodology section. Panel A presents the Tier coefficient for the 
whole sample. Panel B presents the Tier coefficient for acquisitions where the acquirer is an extraordinary acquirer. 
We classify as an extraordinary acquirer those that acquired more than two companies and that had always positive 
cumulative abnormal returns. Panel C presents the Tier coefficient for acquisitions where the acquirer is a normal 
acquirer. The standard errors are adjusted for heterocedasticity and bidder clustering. The regressions are controlled 
for year fixed effects. The symbols ***, ** and *, represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. N designates the number of observations. The total number of observations includes public deals 
in which the premium was not available, and that are not in included when we run the regression only for public 
targets. 
 
  All (1) Public (2) Private (3) Subsidiary (4) 
Panel A: All sample 
Tier 0.010 *** 0.009 ** 0.007  -0.001  
N 6,864  2,971  1,968  1,517  
R2 (%) 10.39  9.16  9.02  19.08  
Panel B: Extraordinary acquirers 
Tier 0.029 *** 0.038 *** 0.030 * 0.016  
N 527  165  184  150  
R2 (%) 29.31  53.11  39.59  36.93  
Panel C: Normal acquirers 
Tier 0.008 ** 0.007 
* 0.003  -0.003  
N 6,337  2,806  1,784  1,367  
R2 (%) 10.04 
 
  9.71   8.99   20.41   
 
4.3  Domestic and cross border acquirers 
We test if our results depend on the fact that the acquirer only performs domestic (or cross border) 
acquisitions or if it acquires both domestic and cross border targets. The intuition behind lies in 
the fact that an acquirer that hires both domestic and international firms should be a more 
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experienced acquirer more used to more complex and different deals. We show that the variable 
Tier is significant for public acquisitions in which the acquirer only acquires US or non-US firms 
but it is not  significant when the acquirer bids for both US and non-US firms (in a sample from 
1990 to 2012). Once again we show that if the acquirer is an experienced investor that acquires 
both domestic and international targets the Tier does not add value anymore. 
Table 7: Cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
for a sample of acquisitions from 1990 to 2012 for acquirers that perform domestic and 
cross border acquisitions 
This table presents the results of regression analysis (Equation (2)) of the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer 
on the tier of the investment bank used as financial advisor and on other acquirer and deal characteristics. This table 
only shows the coefficients of the Tier variable but the regression is estimated with the all the control variables shown 
in Table 3 and described in the methodology section. Panel A presents the Tier coefficient for the whole sample. Panel 
B presents the Tier coefficient for acquirers that from 1990 to 2012 acquired US and non US firms (domestic and 
cross border acquisitions). Panel C presents the Tier coefficient for acquirers that from 1990 to 2012 only acquired 
US and non US firms (domestic or cross border acquisitions). The standard errors are adjusted for heterocedasticity 
and bidder clustering. The regressions are controlled for year fixed effects. The symbols ***, ** and *, represent 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. N designates the number of observations. 
The total number of observations includes public deals in which the premium was not available, and that are not in 
included when we run the regression only for public targets. 
 
  All (1) Public (2) Private (3) Subsidiary (4) 
Panel A: All sample 
Tier 0.010 *** 0.009 ** 0.007  -0,001  
N 6,864  2,971  1,968  1517  
R2 (%) 10.39  9.16  9.02  19.08  
Panel B: Acquirers in domestic and cross border acquisitions 
Tier 0.010 ** 0.000  0.014  0,016  
N 2,168  895  567  441  
R2 (%) 10.63   12.99   11.93   11.73   
Panel C: Acquirers in only domestic or cross border acquisitions 
Tier 0.009 ** 0.015 *** -0.002  -0,003  
N 4,696  2,076  1401  1076  
R2 (%) 11.47   10.31   10.77   10.57   
5   Robustness Tests 
We run several robustness tests to check our results. We confirm that our results do not depend 
on the cut of the number of top tier investment banks. For this purpose, we rerun the analysis for 
cuts of 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10 top banks. The results are not affected either in terms of significance or 
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sign of the coefficients. We also consider as top tier the top 8 investment banks in the year of the 
acquisition (and not in 2012) and our results do not change. This result was expected as League 
Tables are persistent across time. Table 8 presents the results for the robustness tests of the cut of 
the number of top tier investment banks. 
Table 8: Cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
for a sample of acquisitions from 1990 to 2012: robustness cut of the tier 
This table presents the results of regression analysis (Equation (2)) of the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer 
on the tier of the investment bank used as financial advisor and on other acquirer and deal characteristics. This table 
only shows the coefficients of the Tier variable but the regression is estimated with the all the control variables shown 
in Table 3 and described in the methodology section. Panel A presents the Tier coefficient when the top 5 investment 
banks are considered as top tier. Panel B presents the Tier coefficient when the top 10 investment banks are considered 
as top tier. Panel C presents the Tier coefficient when the top 8 investment banks at the time of the acquisition are 
considered as top tier. The standard errors are adjusted for heterocedasticity and bidder clustering. The regressions 
are controlled for year fixed effects. The symbols ***, ** and *, represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. N designates the number of observations. The total number of observations includes 
public deals in which the premium was not available, and that are not in included when we run the regression only for 
public targets. 
  
  All (1) Public (2) Private (3) Subsidiary (4) 
Panel A: Top Tier 5 
Tier 0.010 *** 0.008 ** 0.010  0.000  
N 6,864  2,971  1,968  1,517  
R2 (%) 10.38  9.13  9.06  19.09%  
Panel B: Top Tier 10 
Tier 0.009 *** 0.008 ** 0.006  -0.001  
N 6,864  2,971  1,968  1,517  
R2 (%) 10.36  9.12  9.01  19.09  
Panel C: Top Tier at the year of the acquisition 
Tier 0.008 ** 0.006 ** 0.008  -0.001  
N 6,864  2,971  1,968  1,517  
R2 (%) 10.34   9.07   9.03   19.09   
         
In some acquisitions the acquirer hires a consortium of financial advisors to perform the valuation 
and execution of the deal. In more than 900 deals (around 15% of the sample) the acquirer hires 
more than one investment bank. We test if the number of financial advisors has an impact on the 
cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer. The variable “number of financial advisors” is only 
significant for acquisitions where the target is a private company and it never affects the 
significance level of the top tier variable.  
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We also control if the tier of the target has an impact on the returns of the acquirer. We add a 
dummy to Equation (2) that is equal to one if the target hired a top tier bank as a financial advisor. 
This variable is not significant and has no impact on the level of significance of the coefficient of 
the variable tier (tier of the financial advisor hired by the acquirer). 
Table 9: Cross-sectional OLS regression analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
for a sample of acquisitions from 1990 to 2012: robustness number of advisors and Tier of 
the target 
This table presents the results of regression analysis (Equation (2)) of the cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer 
on the tier of the investment bank used as financial advisor and on other acquirer and deal characteristics. This table 
shows the coefficients of the Tier variable but the regression is estimated with the all the control variables shown in 
Table 3 and described in the methodology section. Panel A presents the Tier coefficient when we add to Equation (2) 
the number of advisors hired by the acquirer as control variable. Panel B presents the Tier coefficient when we add 
to Equation (2) the Tier of the investment bank hired by the target as control variable. The standard errors are adjusted 
for heterocedasticity and bidder clustering. The regressions are controlled for year fixed effects. The symbols ***, ** 
and *, represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. N designates the number 
of observations. The total number of observations includes public deals in which the premium was not available, and 
that are not in included when we run the regression only for public targets. 
 
  All (1) Public (2) Private (3) Subsidiary (4) 
Panel A: Number of advisors 
Tier 0.010 *** 0.010 ** 0.005  0.002  
N advisors 0.000  -0.003  0.022 ** -0.010  
N 6,864  2,971  1,968  1,517  
R2 (%) 10.39  9.19  9.30  19.29  
Panel B: Tier of the target 
Tier 0.010 *** 0.009 ** 0.007  0.000  
Tier target -0.003  -0.004  0.001  -0.002  
N 6,864  2,971  1,968  1,517  
R2 (%) 10.40   9.20   9.03   19.09   
 
It is only possible to achieve unbiased coefficients estimates in Equation (2) using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method if the regressors are exogenous. We follow the methodology of 
Golubov et al. (2012) and we use the Heckman two stage procedure to test if we have a sample 
bias. This sample bias consists in the fact that the CARs might not be higher because the advisor 
is a top tier investment bank but because a top tier bank is able to choose better deals where the 
returns are expected to be higher. The most relevant results of the Heckman method are presented 
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in Table 10. The inverse Mills ratio adjusts for the non-zero mean of the error term and it is not 
significant which means that there is not a sample bias and that the estimates from Table 3 are 
reliable.  
Table 10: Heckman two-stage procedure for a sample of acquisitions from 1990 to 2012 
This table presents the results of the Heckman two stage procedure to test for sample bias. The column selection (sel.) 
shows the scope coefficient of the probit equation [Equation (3)] and the column outcome (out.) shows the inverse 
mills ratio (IMR) coefficient of Equation (4). Panel A presents the coefficients of the regressions when the acquirer is 
a US public firm and the target is an US public, private or subsidiary firm. Panel B presents the coefficients of the 
regressions when the acquirer is a US public firm and the target is a non-US public, private or subsidiary firm. The 
scope variable accounts for the number of times that in the past (after 1985) the acquirer has used a top tier investment 
bank as a financial advisor on a buy-side (as an acquirer) or on a sell-side (as a target)  in a previous acquisition. The 
symbols ***, ** and *, represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. N 
designates the number of observations. The total number of observations includes public deals in which the premium 
was not available, and that are not in included when we run the regression only for public targets. 
 
  Public (2) Private (3) Subsidiary (4) 
  Sel.   Out.   Sel.   Out.   Sel.   Out.   
Panel A: Domestic acquisitions 
Scope 0.026 ***  0.056 ***  0.029 
**   
IMR   -0.03    -.097    0.127  
N 2,647  790  1,612  272  1,006  294  
R2 
(%) 
17.30  6.74  20.46  14.97  15.90  60.76  
Panel B: Cross border acquisitions 
Scope 0.042 ***  0.061 ***  0.055 ***  
IMR   -0.01    0.01    -0.01  
N 327  117  356  69  513  182  
R2 
(%) 
8.28   -6.67   11.08   -2.03   11.57   0.54   
 
Andrade et al. (2001) finds empirical evidence that acquisitions are clustered by industry. Liu and 
Qiu (2013) explains that industry clustering in acquisitions is driven by industry specific shocks, 
such as, changes in costs, demand and deregulation. We control for industry clustering and neither 
the significance, the sign or magnitude of the coefficients change.  
Liu and Qiu (2013) investigates the differences between firms that acquire foreign firms in 
developing markets and those that acquire firms in developed markets. They show that US firms 
that acquire firms in developed countries are significantly worse (in operational terms) than those 
that acquire firms in developing countries. We test if the development of the target in cross border 
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acquisitions affect the significance of the Tier variable. We consider as developed countries those 
that belong to OECD and we don’t find any significant differences in terms of the impact of top 
tier banks on the returns around the announcement period.   
6   Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the role of top tier investment banks as financial advisors in acquisitions. By 
using a sample of more than 6,000 acquisitions from 1990 to 2012, we find evidence that the choice 
of a top tier investment bank has a positive impact on the returns of the acquirer in public 
acquisitions. This result holds for both domestic and cross border acquisitions. However, if we 
consider a subsample of acquisitions in which the acquirer is an institutional investor the tier of 
the investment bank is not significant for public acquisitions. This can be explained by the fact 
that the significance of the tier is related to the reputation and expertise of the advisor that is 
needed for more complex acquisitions (which explains why the tier is only significant for public 
acquisitions) and in cases in which the acquirer is not an institutional investor with large pool of 
assets under management. This is a strong indication that top tier advisors do matter when their 
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